“Who is John Galt?”–this is the opening line and indeed the most prevalent question in the entirety of Ayn Rand’s novel, Atlas Shrugged (11). It is repeated from one side of the country to the other and by many different people. It is an expression of hopelessness in a world filled with despair. The dystopian world of Atlas Shrugged is the creation of altruists, looters, and moochers. Galt might believe “created” to be a strong word, since, in his view, it is actually their lack of creating that brought about this dystopian state. He particularly blames those in politics, who make deals to take assets from the producers by force; and distribute them to their friends and those who don’t produce.

To get some idea of the conflict that exists between Galt and the corrupt American government, think of the Sheriff of Nottingham in the tale (or “myth”) of Robin Hood. You have the Sheriff over-taxing the people into extreme poverty, and over and over again we see Robin Hood taking the stolen property from the Sheriff and giving it back to the impoverished community (Taylor, 290). I think Galt would have approved of this early version of Robin Hood, prior to the idea that he was stealing from the rich and giving to the poor. In light of this, you might even say that Galt is the Robin Hood of America, since throughout the book, he and his followers do just that. As you can see, the plot of this story is a good one, but it rests on a very extreme and controversial philosophy–Objectivism.

To start, using an assortment of strategically chosen quotes from Galt’s long speech at the end of Atlas Shrugged, I will attempt a summary of his ethic (915).

Man’s mind is his basic tool of survival. (926)

To remain alive, he must think. (926)

But to think is an act of choice. (926)

A being of volitional consciousness has no automatic course of behavior. He needs a code of values to guide his actions. (926)

Man’s life is the standard of morality, but your own life is its purpose. If existence on earth is your goal, you must choose your actions and values by the standard of that which is proper to man—for the purpose of preserving, fulfilling and enjoying the irreplaceable value which is your life. (928)

Since life requires a specific course of action, any other course will destroy it. (928)

Happiness is the successful state of life, pain is an agent of death. (928)

Just as I support my life, neither by robbery nor alms, but by my own effort, so I do not seek to derive my happiness from the injury or the favor of others, but earn it by my own achievement. (935)

Do you ask what moral obligation I owe to my fellow men? (936)

I seek or desire nothing from them except such relations as they care to enter of their own voluntary choice. (936)

In Socratic Puzzles, the Libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick delivers a detailed critique of Objectivism in the chapter entitled On the Randian Argument. This chapter has the above argument broken into 4 main parts (249):

(I) To the conclusion that only living beings have values with a point.

(II) From I, to the conclusion that life itself is a value to a living being which

has it.

(III) From II, to the conclusion that life, as a rational person, is a value to the

person whose life it is.

(IV) From III, to some principle about interpersonal behavior and rights and

purposes. (250)

While reflecting on these parts, it is also worth noting that Nozick himself had difficulty discerning the details of the Objectivist ethic. He said it this way, “Unfortunately, it is not clear (to me) exactly what the argument is” (249).

Here, it becomes clear that IV is the most interesting part to Galt’s argument, at least with respect to Father Zosima’s ethical conclusions, which we will consider later in this post. It is, after all, the conclusion of how we as individuals should live with respect to ourselves and interact with others. Before we go any further, I would like to point out that parts (I-III) are being assumed as true for the sake of argument alone. Neither Nozick nor myself are able to find good solid objective evidence for either (I), (II), or (III) in any of the consulted works by Rand (252). Hence, we must give Rand, and thus Galt, the benefit of the doubt and assume that perhaps she had underlying beliefs that didn’t make it into her work.^[1] For speculation about what these underlying beliefs might be see Nozick, Socratic Puzzles, 1997. Only by granting these assumptions, can we move on to discus the conclusion.

Built into (IV) are a few absolutes that negate things such as sacrifice and altruism. But are these negations necessary, or to take it a step further, are they even valid? Nozick breaks down the transition from (III) to (IV) like this:

Starting with:

(1) For each person, the living and prolongation of his own life is a value for him

to get to

(2) No person should sacrifice his life for another; we would need, in addition

to (1)

(1’) For each person, the living and prolongation of his own life (as a rational

being) is the greatest value for him.

[And: Each person ought to pursue his greatest value.] (258-259)

Nozick makes note that (at the time he was writing) neither Galt, Rand, nor any Objectivist had offered any argument, such that it fulfils (1’) (259). But if we take it as a given that Galt assumes and agrees with (1’), we can then ask, is (1’) true? It seems that it isn’t, for we know that there are many people who willingly go to war and risk, even sacrifice, their own lives daily. And presumably they do this for something that they value more than their own lives–the lives of their families, friends, and countrymen, and even for freedom itself. Galt may ask, “But should they?” For that is the very issue. People squander their lives and others suck them dry. Which prompts us to ask, why shouldn’t they have values that are greater than their own lives? For which we hear the response from Galt, because such a person “is acting on the motive and standard of death” (928). Yet we have already rejected one’s life as the Greatest value, so choices leading to one’s death are not an issue as long as their value is greater than one’s life. This example clearly shows an alternative to (1’) from raw experience. It just doesn’t seem to be the case that (1’) is true. In fact, the alternative seems more likely in this case and if (1’) cannot stand, neither can (2), in its entirety. (2) must be stripped of its absoluteness, of it’s always being the case, and must be reformulated.

Having established that, as an absolute, (2) is unfounded since (1’) cannot stand; consider (2b):

          (2b) No person should sacrifice his life for anything of lesser value than his life.

Notice that with this simple change we no longer need (1’) as a supporting premise, but we do need something similar to Nozick’s original And statement. Let’s call it (1b):

(1b) No person should sacrifice anything of value for anything of lesser value.

The argument as it now stands is sound.

(1) For each person, the living and prolongation of his own life is a value for him

(1b) No person should sacrifice anything of value for anything of lesser value.

Therefore,
(2b) No person should sacrifice his life for anything of lesser value than his life.

Galt’s next argument describes how the self should interface with the other. Nozick summarizes it this way:

(3) No person should sacrifice another person (‘s life) to himself (his own). (259)

The interesting thing here is that whether we grant (1’) or not, Galt simply doesn’t provide an argument to get from (2) to (3). In fact, a stronger, and easier, argument can be made for (3) from (2b) than can be made from  (2). One has better footing for such an argument when the value of one’s self is found to be equal to the value of the other; and an argument from the perspective of one’s own life being one’s greatest value, makes for a hard sell when considering any reasons to respect the values of the other to the point of not violating them for self gain. Galt would presumably bring up something here about the self losing self-esteem and a number of other similar arguments, but what is a temporary loss of self-esteem when one’s life can be saved by the sacrifice of another? Mind you, I’m not backing this stance, but merely using it as a counter argument.

Galt is right however, that such a belief, the belief that one’s life is not of greater value than all other values, can lead to some tricky ethical situations. And the same is true for devaluing another’s life. These situations are sometimes misguided and may end in catastrophe. In fact, it is the kind of move that Galt makes here, deciding that the value of the self is above all others, that Father Zosima seems to be reacting to. Zosima meets an extreme with an extreme. ^[2]Featured Image Credit and Info: http://igorrybaltchenko.deviantart.com/art/Atlas-Statue-337890511 CC License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/legalcode